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Review Essay 
Should Feminists "Forget Foucault"? 
Dominique D. Fisher 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
Up Against Foucault (1993), a collection of essays edited by 
Caroline Ramazanoglu, reevaluates Michel Foucault's theories on 
power and sexuality in regard to feminism from a sociological per- 
spective. It is certainly a truism to state that although Foucault con- 
sidered feminism as a revolutionary movement, he did not write 
with a feminist perspective in mind. Not only did he advocate the 
decriminalization of rape, but he also dedicated little space to wom- 
en's specificity in his work. His History of Sexuality addresses 
women peripherally, dedicating only a few pages to the hysterization 
of women's bodies and to a brief reading of the Lapcourt incident 
(which, in Kape Soper's view, could very well serve as an example 
of sexual harrassment and sexual abuse).' Given that Foucault's 
theories of power and sexuality do not focus mainly on women or 
gender construction, one may wonder a priori whether it is legiti- 
mate to seek new directions for feminist studies in Foucault and, if 
so, why and to what extent feminists can gain from his work? In- 
deed, that Foucault is neither a feminist nor a gender theorist has 
little impact on the pertinence of his work for feminist studies. The 
problem, as Jean Grimshaw affirms, is "rather a question of what 
affinities there are between some of the questions that feminist 
theory addressed and those that Foucault addresses" (52). 
Foucault's central interest in the functioning of power in mod- 
ern societies imports findings significant to any marginalized group, 
informing gender and cultural studies with both a demystification 
of power and an analysis of the multiple forces at work in oppres- 
sor/oppressed relations.2 Although Foucault's influence on cultural 1
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studies goes beyond the scope of Up Against Foucault, several of 
the collection's articles appeal to the necessity for feminism to move 
beyond Western parameters. Thus, in the last decades, the feminist 
"new wave" (often seen as postmodern) has attempted to overthrow 
what is commonly referred to as "essentialism," that is, an empha- 
sis on the binary opposition between "men" and "women," in favor 
of theories more encompassing of race, class, and sexual orienta- 
tions. In this sense, most of the articles in the collection, albeit not 
without certain reservations, do attest to the relevance of Foucault's 
theories on sex and sexuality for feminism since they contribute to 
unveiling the artificiality of the gender dichotomy and shed light 
on the encoding of subjectivity and bodies within the power-knowl- 
edge system (although Adrienne Rich has raised these issues more 
radically-for women- in her analysis of compulsory heterosexu- 
ality).' The interest of Foucault's work for the feminist "new wave" 
relies on what is commonly seen as their shared break with the 
modernist (dualist) system of thought, a break which has enabled 
feminist studies to move beyond oppositional schemes of "mascu- 
linity" and "femininity" to explore (women's) identity in light of 
Jana Sawicki's "politics of difference" (Bailey 119). 
Foucault's archaeological and genealogical methods thus pro- 
vide important links in the problematizing of the gender dichotomy 
and mechanisms of power. Power is at the core of Foucault's entire 
corpus (whether it be analyzed in reference to psychiatry, medi- 
cine, disciplines, or the human sciences). Foucault's originality re- 
sides in his demonstration of how power in a modern context regu- 
lates the entire field of knowledge. Power in Foucault's sense is no 
longer located in the sovereignty of the nation-state but in a mul- 
tiple, diffuse, and unsteady network of relations of force that work 
through an infinity of microstructures: schools, hospitals, prisons, 
law, sex, knowledges, discourses, etc. Being diffuse, yet nonethe- 
less omnipresent ("it comes from everywhere" [History 93]), power 
affects every sphere of the social and political, including the 
microlevels of human relations and daily life, since it modulates 
the construction of our bodies and identities. However, precisely 
because power is mobile and unsteady, it is capable of producing 
resistances. In this respect, power is generative of creative forces, a 
hypothesis which in itself is not without interest for feminism. But 
neither is it without problems, since the effectiveness of women's 
resistance, or that of any other marginalized groups, seems highly 
debatable in the society of the 1990s. Maureen McNeil points, for 2




example, to the "considerable pessimism about feminism" in the 
1990s, a pessimism due simultaneously to a backlash against femi- 
nism and women which is widely fed by mass media, the rise of the 
"not-so-new right," the dominance of conservative governments in 
most Western countries, and the economic recession (164). Simi- 
larly, Kate Soper speculates about the extent to which feminism or 
even gay culture has broken down misogynous and homophobic 
parameters of normalization and exclusion, and thus urges us to 
take into account the negative impact of recuperation phenomena 
and mass-media power. 
Foucault on violence and domination 
While most of the essays in Up Against Foucault acknowledge 
the importance of Foucault's theories of power, identity, and dif- 
ference, they agree that their application to feminism is nonethe- 
less questionable. Violence exercised against women in our societ- 
ies has raised suspicions about Foucault's ideas. Whereas Foucault 
establishes a certain distinction between violence and power, femi- 
nists see violence as a constituent element of power: "power is not 
neutral, diffuse and freely available but fiercely protected by those 
who hold it and their agents . . . threats and the actual use of force 
and violence remain essential to the exercise of power" (MacCannel 
and MacCannel 205). 
Contrary to Max Weber, for whom domination is precisely what 
permits power to be exercised and for whom violence is the truth to 
power relations, Foucault does not reduce power to violence. How- 
ever, as Gilles Deleuze has rightly noted, Foucault does not thereby 
exclude violence. Understood less as a constituent element of power, 
violence is rather "a concomitance or consequence of force" (70). 
Force, adds Deleuze, is never singular insofar as it always works 
"in relation with other forces . . . that is power." Thus, according to 
Deleuze, Foucault's distinction between violence and power relies 
on the nature of their object: whereas the object of violence is a 
form (bodies and beings, destroyed or re-shaped) and, in this sense, 
specific, the object of power is force (a multiple relation of forces) 
and is unspecified. The object of force lies in "an open list of vari- 
ables expressing a relation between forces or power relations, con- 
stituting actions upon actions: to incite, to induce, to seduce, to 
make easy or difficult, to enlarge or limit, to make more or less 
probable, and so on" (70). It should also be noted that Deleuzian as 3
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well as Foucauldian terminology unhesitantly falls back on metapors 
of violence to speak of power.4 Power indeed includes violence but 
the latter is not the whole of the former. In this sense, Foucault is 
"closer to Nietzsche (and to Marx), for whom the relation between 
forces greatly exceeds violence and cannot be defined by the lat- 
ter" (70). If Foucault did not expand the role of violence in his 
analysis of mechanisms of power, he nonetheless argued that vio- 
lence manifests itself in relation to power in extreme situations: 
[the analysis of power] should be concerned with power at its 
extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those points where 
it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms 
and institutions. Its paramount concern, in fact, should be with 
the point where power surmounts the rules of right which or- 
ganize and limit it and extends itself beyond them, invests it- 
self in institutions, becomes embodied in techniques, and equips 
itself with instruments and eventually violent means of mate- 
rial intervention. ("Two Lectures" 96) 
This comment by Foucault has provoked critiques which in fact do 
not concern only feminists since, according to Dean MacCannel 
and Juliet Flower MacCannel, it minimizes violence and even dis- 
misses domination and repression: "it suggests an historical decline 
of physical violence and ongoing redistribution of power on the 
local and regional level at a time when neither is happening" (212). 
Yet Foucault did not exactly speak of a disappearance of physical 
or institutional violence. Concerned mainly with "material institu- 
tions" which have recourse to violence by means of "torture and 
imprisonment," he indeed posits the necessity "to locate power at 
the extreme points of its exercise, where it is always less legal in 
character" ("Two Lectures" 97). However, for Dean MacCannel 
and Juliet Flower MacCannel, Foucault's statement on violence does 
not "speak of and for [victims of assault], he does not speak from 
their perspective, nor does he incorporate their 'local' knowledge 
into understanding local practices of power" (205). 
Citing striking examples of the relation between violence and 
power taken from actual sexual abuse and rape cases, Dean 
MacCannel and Juliet Flower MacCannel analyze the victims' re- 
sponses. They observe that victims of rape, domestic violence, and 
sexual abuse are in most cases silenced (e.g. either they cannot speak 
about it or they blame themselves). This silencing results from re- 4




sponses overcoded by guilt, which itself is induced by constant 
cultural, social, and legal pressures to conform to (phallocentric) 
norms: "As symbol, the 'father figure' is a decent general model 
for balancing and modulating passions and drives, leading to the 
smooth functioning of modern democratic institutions at all levels" 
(218). The impact of both the private and the public on the victims' 
responses leads the authors to redefine violence. For them, violence 
is not limited solely to "direct violence," but rather is "capillary" (a 
Foucauldian notion), most notable when it manifests itself by means 
of "legal and/or bureaucratic violence" and "administrative vio- 
lence."' These three modes of violence operate in a combined man- 
ner to legitimate violence and to corroborate the silence of victims, 
thereby revealing the existence of multipunctual interactions be- 
tween power, violence, and sexual pleasure. Violence in this case 
appears as a far more complex phenomenon than in Foucault's sense, 
since its object is as unspecified as the object of force (power); 
consequently violence and power are of the same nature, that is, 
multifaceted. 
How can beheaded power exercise domination and generate 
resistance? 
It is important to note here that most of the critiques in Up 
Against Foucault rely nevertheless on his very conception of power, 
either addressing the inadequacy of his conception of violence within 
his theory of power or the impossibility to locate power's source. 
Foucault's renouncement of sovereign power does pose certain prob- 
lems for feminists who consider patriarchy to be the origin of 
women's subordination; they see Foucault's "decapitation" of the 
Prince as a "tyranny of the structurelessness" (57).6 Torii Moi has 
argued that Foucault's complex interaction of power and sexuality 
leads to a "depolitization of feminism" (51) since it is no longer 
possible to say that women are oppressed under a patriarchal re- 
gime. But does Foucault's conception of power as multifaceted 
announce the death of patriarchy? 
Here it is necessary to readdress Foucault's conception of 
power. Although Foucault sees power as omnipresent, he does not 
explain it in terms of coercion or repression but in terms of produc- 
tion: in the case of sexuality, power produces a space of truth and 
science (a scientia sexualis). It is a system of extremely mobile 
strategic relations which are not far removed from those involved 
in communication yet which are not entirely reducible to them: 5
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The "distribution of power" and the "appropriation of knowl- 
edge" never represent only instantaneous slices taken from pro- 
cesses involving, for example, a cumulative reinforcement of 
the strongest factor, or a reversal of relationship, or again, a 
simultaneous increase of the two terms. Relations of power- 
knowledge are not static forms of distribution, they are "matri- 
ces of transformations." (History 99) 
Power relations, far from being the effect of a sovereign instance 
that exercises itself over others, that is, far from being subjective, 
are displayed in a network of multiple blind and mute strategies: 
the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is 
often the case that no one is there to have invented them, and 
few who can be said to have formulated them: an implicit char- 
acteristic of the great anonymous, almost unspoken strategies 
which coordinate the loquacious tactics whose "inventors" or 
decision makers are often without hypocrisy. (History 95) 
In terms of sexual politics, Foucault does not view sexuality as a 
repressive instance but as an effect of power, that is, a producer of 
truth. Up Against Foucault is critical of this conception, since "truth" 
for the authors is often perceived as an absolute whose production 
elides the fact that oppression of women largely operates via sexual 
repression. In this respect, the collection obscures the fact that sexual 
politics for Foucault relies on micropowers (in the past, the church, 
and, today clinics) that push subjects to confession and avowal in 
order to establish new normative sexual policies in accord with the 
revolving needs of History.' These norms in turn generate resis- 
tances and counter-attacks in Foucault's view. Norms become the 
object of resistances and "reverse discourses," yet they are the "odd 
term in relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an 
irreducible opposite . . and are distributed in irregular fashion" 
(History 96). Foucault's resistance hypothesis has evoked many 
critiques outside feminism. Habermas has stressed the weakness of 
Foucault's position on resistance since it excludes "cognitive privi- 
lege on the basis of a philosophy of history" (281) in order to be 
conceived as an effect of power. Counterpower by nature is thus 
quickly absorbed into the power it opposes and is "transformed as 
soon as it is victorious, into a complex that provokes a new 
counterpower" (281). 6




If the question of resistance remains problematic for Habermas 
and feminists at both a practical and theoretical level, one may 
wonder whether it is due to Foucault's yielding to the idealism of 
the 1960s, which thought of desire as a subversive force capable of 
dismantling repressive institutions and of revolutionizing the en- 
tire society, or whether it is because he wrote at a time when the 
shadows of social revolutions were already vanishing or, even worse, 
dissolving into the order of simulation as Baudrillard insisted in his 
critique of Foucault.' By putting the emphasis on the micropolitics 
of desire, not only did Foucault derail the repressive hypothesis in 
History, but he put aside, as Habermas pointed out, the "repressive 
desublimation" factor that was, according to Marcuse and others, 
hidden behind the sexual revolution.' On the other hand, one may 
wonder whether critics have put too much emphasis on Foucault's 
renouncement of the repressive hypothesis and if this renounce- 
ment indeed excludes domination, and thus violence, from power, 
given that the production of discourse also works in conjunction 
with confessional practices. 
The problem lies here in Foucault's definitions of violence and 
domination. We have already seen in examples of assault cases that 
violence is multipunctual. Moreover, it is distributed according to 
hard (molar) and soft (molecular) forces and in this way mirrors 
forces of power. If Foucault's notion of violence as having a spe- 
cific object is inoperative in the understanding of everyday vio- 
lence in a feminist context, his definition of domination indeed ac- 
counts for the multiple hidden strategies at work in institutional 
violence: 
in speaking of domination I do not have in mind that solid and 
global kind of domination that one person exercises over other, 
or one group over another that can be exercised within society. 
Not the domination of the King in his central position, there- 
fore, but that of his subjects in their mutual relations: not the 
uniform edifice of sovereignty, but the multiple forms of sub- 
jugation that have a place and a function within the social or- 
ganism. ("Two Lectures" 96) 
Foucault did not exclude domination from power but aimed to 
replace sovereignty with multipunctual domination in order "to 
expose its latent nature and its brutality" ("Two Lectures" 95). 
Whether he succeeded or not, as we will address below, requires a 
reexamination of his conception of panopticism. 7
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Habermas posits the ambiguity or, in his terms, a certain "con- 
servatism" of Foucault's conception of power in its "filter[ing] out 
of the history of penal practices itself all aspects of legal regula- 
tion," which itself is in a doublebind: "in the welfare-state democ- 
racies of the West, the spread of legal regulation has the structure 
of a dilemma, because it is the legal means for securing freedom 
that themselves endanger the freedom of their presumptive benefi- 
ciaries" (290-91). For Habermas, Foucault's sexual politics also fall 
into the same trap since they paradoxically rely on an "early Ro- 
mantic" notion of subjectivity, which overemphasizes the ability 
of subjects to express themselves. Similarly, Nancy Fraser points 
out that Foucault's conception of the resisting subject is symptom- 
atic of an "unacknowledged acceptance of Enlightenment values 
of freedom" (55). In Habermas's view, Foucault disqualifies "the 
problematic structure of a long-term process of individuation and 
interiorization (accompanied by techniques of disclosure and strat- 
egies of surveillance) that simultaneously creates new zones of alien- 
ation and normalization" (291). From this Habermas concludes that 
Foucault fails to take into consideration not only the existence of 
various types of discourses and knowledge at work in power, but 
also the various technologies of subjugation around which a com- 
plex of power can exercise subordination in both the private and 
the public spheres. For Habermas, an understanding of power pre- 
supposes an understanding of the dominated subject, of the inter- 
nal reasons for a possible manipulation of bodies. Habermas's ob- 
jections are, in this respect, in accord with those of feminists. 
In effect, Up Against Foucault, like many other critiques, draws 
attention to the fact that technologies of power involved in the ex- 
clusion of women and underprivileged people from discourse, far 
from inciting re-emergences of suppressed knowledges, indeed 
maintain silencing-as is the case of victims of direct or institu- 
tional violence. Maureen Cain takes Pierre Riviere and Herculine 
Barbin, whose voices were sounded only after their death and 
throughout a series of interpretations, as examples of the limited 
efficiency of pre-discursive realities. Feminists have also demon- 
strated how repressed knowledges discreetly remain just that in so- 
called liberating or liberated practices. Maureen McNeil recalls, 
for example, that Juliet Mitchell's work indeed shows how psycho- 
analysis, "far from liberating women," provides an "adequate ac- 
count of how patriarchy 'worked' " (153) since its politics of self- 
regulation and self-control docilely recircuits women back into tradi- 8




tional power relations. "Hence, women have realized power in mar- 
riage, in the traditional nuclear family through cultivating forms of 
self-knowledge-ironically, sometimes even in the name of femi- 
nism" (167). While Sandra Bartky argues that the "facelessness" of 
power in the fashion and beauty industry (Grimshaw 53) illustrates 
Foucault's multipunctual theory of power, Susan Bordo, like 
Baudrillard, sees limits in Foucault's theory of power as it leaves 
aside the manipulative effects of hyperreality that are increasingly 
at work in popular and mass-media culture, and most notably, at a 
time when plastic surgery is "more affordable to the middle class," 
and when "liposuction is the most frequently requested operation 
with breast enlargement" (196). According to Susan Bordo, images 
of female power such as those of Cher and Madonna which exploit 
the rhetoric of choice and liberation demonstrate that the mystifi- 
cation to which these images proceed is not simply limited to nor- 
malization, since they are unavoidably "strongly racially, ethnically 
and heterosexually inflected" (196). It is most patent in Cher's face 
and body whose multiple surgical reconstructions (or rather 
deconstructions) have erased both the "defects" of age and ethnicity, 
and in Madonna whose transvestite or "lesbian" on-stage appear- 
ances reinforce at once heterosexuality and homophobia.' Jean 
Grimshaw has also called into question Foucault's views on self- 
discipline and self-monitoring practices, most specifically in his 
last essays, since these practices are no longer disciplinary but gen- 
erative of autonomy. She notes that nowhere does Foucault address 
the issue of the male gaze, not in itself, but rather as "a whole appa- 
ratus of self-surveillance" (56) that dominates contemporary cul- 
ture and establishes a regime of asceticism not only in fashion, 
beauty, fitness, and body-building, but, most dramatically, in anor- 
exia. 
Feminism and panopticism: toward a more comprehensive 
view of surveillance 
Suspicious of Foucault's view of sexual liberation, which more- 
over does not escape androcentric bias, feminists have on the other 
hand established the pertinence of his theories on sex and power in 
relation to deconstructing the notion of feminine essence." M.E. 
Bailey, Janet Ransom, Kate Soper, and Maureen McNeil see 
Foucault's reevaluation of identity, sex, and bodies as central to 
pointing out the limits of an essentialist feminist critique in a po- 9
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litical context. M.E. Bailey recalls that since the 1960s feminists 
have questioned the "dualistic categories men and women as given, 
natural and eternal categories" (99). The oppositional men/women 
model sustains the notion of a feminine nature which is at once 
immutable, universal, and transhistorical, and therefore fictional 
from a Foucauldian perspective. Moreover, such an essentialist defi- 
nition of the feminine takes into consideration neither the effect of 
cultural constructs of the feminine nor differences existing between 
women, whether they be social, racial, or sexual. Woman from an 
essentialist viewpoint is indeed an abstract entity which, ironically, 
is conceived within (Western) phalloheterocentric parameters since 
the differences between men and women are drawn mainly from 
the differences between the sexes. 
Well before the History of Sexuality, Foucault had demonstrated 
in Naissance de la clinique that knowledges are not neutral but are 
the effect of power since they evolve with history so as to establish 
new and fictional models of truth and reality that end up becoming 
convenient modes of control whose efficiency rises gradually ac- 
cording to a lesser degree of visibility and a greater degree of dif- 
fuseness. This is the case of modern nosology, whose system of 
knowledge relies less on the "intellectual gaze" than on the 
aesthetization of the clinical gaze, thus placing both patient and 
researchers into a panoptical situation. In the case of women's iden- 
tity, one could say that by making sexes, feminine identity, and 
bodies extra-social categories, essentialist feminists succumbed to 
a panoptical effect which ironically helped to maintain the status 
quo, that is, the patriarchal order. While M.E. Bailey does not cri- 
tique essentialism in these terms, she approaches this when she 
stresses the dangers of "a static notion of patriarchal power as op- 
pression and repression" (99) which undermines the existence of 
the equation made between women and their (hypersexualized) 
bodies and consequently participates in a depolitization of women's 
bodies, sexuality, and identity. 
It should be noted here that M.E. Bailey focuses solely on the 
History of Sexuality, which nonetheless articulates the categories 
of sex and sexualities as effects of power. Foucault's conception of 
power-knowledge in the History of Sexuality is indeed compatible 
with feminist critiques of essentialism such as that of Sandra Bartky, 
for whom "the twentieth century's cultural investment of female 
bodies with sexuality and libido [has been made] through and around 
the ideal of the 'feminine' " (qtd. in Bailey 104), and of Judith 10




Butler, for whom genders are both performances and pure 
simulacra." M.E. Bailey thus acknowledges the relevance of 
Foucault's theories which allow her, along with Sandra Bartky, to 
deconstruct essentialism into "an expression of power-knowledge" 
(104). In this logic, for M.E. Bailey, patriarchy can no longer be 
regarded as a single source of power over women. Hence, she claims 
that Foucault's work, because it pushes women to renounce patri- 
archy, "suggests that historically there may have been no universal 
and consequent oppression of women by men" (104). In the same 
line of thought, Torii Moi has also pointed to the challenge Fou- 
cault poses for feminism: "we can never answer the question of 
what resists power, nor give any fundamental critique of the notion 
of 'power' itself- (Grimshaw 51). Furthermore, Jean Grimshaw ar- 
gues that work like Sheila Jeffrey's which positions heterosexual- 
ity as "the central site of male oppression of women (58) is incom- 
patible with Foucault's theory of power. 
Here, two interlinked questions inevitably come to mind. Why 
is so little attention granted in these cases to Foucault's conception 
of panopticism, which extends far beyond the Bentham apparatus 
(a panopticon) and the prison system and allows for a dissociation 
of seeing and being seen?" This affects the entire field of knowl- 
edge and thereby concerns feminism, especially in terms of a theory 
of the "male" gaze. Secondly, what in Foucault's analysis of power 
as a diffuse, "capillary," and unsteady agency provokes the conclu- 
sion that patriarchy or heterosexuality in themselves can no longer 
be considered operative sources of power and should thus be put in 
parentheses? Can Foucault's notion of panopticism and its conse- 
quences facilitate an understanding of power in modern societies? 
Oppositional forces and Foucault's panopticism 
Gilles Deleuze has noted the various meanings that panopticism 
incurs in Foucault's work: 
When Foucault defines Panopticism, either he specifically sees 
it as an optical or luminous arrangement that characterizes 
prison, or he views it abstractly, as a machine that not only 
affects visible matter in general (a workshop, barracks, school 
or hospital as much as a prison) but also in general passes 
through every articulable function. So the abstract formula of 
Panopticism is no longer 'to see without being seen' but to 11
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impose a particular conduct on a particular human multiplic- 
ity. We need only to insist that the multiplicity is reduced and 
confined to a tight space and that the imposition of a form of 
conduct is done by distributing in space, laying out, and serial- 
izing in time, composing in space-time, and so on. (33-34) 
Deleuze defines the panopticon as an "abstract machine," which 
is both "blind and mute, even though it makes others see and speak" 
(34), an "abstract machine" that not only regulates the entire social 
field but all discursive and non-discursive (visible) formations as it 
rewrites and doubles history and produces artificial realities and 
models of truth. Panopticism is more a "diagram" or "a map of 
relation between forces" (36) than a structure: it transforms the old 
vertical structure of power into a transversal or rhizomatic network 
(map) of multiple relations of forces that are molecular and un- 
steady. Deleuze notes that Foucault's "diagram" that is panopticism 
is particularly apt to define power in modern societies. Indeed, he 
specifies that already Gabriel Tarde's microsociology, by focusing 
on the importance in modern societies of "small relations such as 
`imitation' " in the "propagation" of belief, desire, and "invention," 
had shown how power relies on a panoptical mechanism (36). In 
this sense, although Foucault never discussed the role of communi- 
cations, thus avoiding, as Baudrillard pointed out, an analysis of 
the impact of media power as well as the effects of simulations in 
the hyperreal stage of our societies, his panoptical machine does 
not necessarily preclude this element. Indeed, if Foucault had fo- 
cused on communications, it is unsure whether they would have 
assumed the extreme form of a dead power or of spirals of simu- 
lated power as they do for Baudrillard. 
Power as a panoptical mechanism in Foucault's sense may be a 
virtual and potential system of relations of forces which nonethe- 
less become manifest at a macroscopic level (school, workshops, 
army, the State, etc.). Institutions thus ultimately give shape to the 
fluctuating matter and diffuse function of power. Deleuze adds that 
the realization process operates by divergences, dualisms, and dif- 
ferentiations; it is in this concrete realization of power that "appear 
the great dualities between classes," the "governing and the gov- 
erned," the public and the private (38). It is also in the realization 
process that discursive and non-discursive (unspoken and visible) 
formations split. Without this split, knowledge would not be the 
cause of power and vice versa. 12




Foucault's pluralistic theory of power does not therefore ex- 
clude dualities; the oppressor/oppressed opposition remains actu- 
alized in modern societies. It does not, then, necessarily imply that 
feminists should disregard patriarchal power. Patriarchy, like any 
other institution, is beheaded and as such operates in a fluctuating 
and diffuse manner within the broader system of power-knowledge. 
Patriarchy, like all micropower, reexploits discursive and 
nondiscursive formations, causing them to bifurcate so as to fic- 
tionalize reality according to the needs of history. Susan Bordo's 
work on the construction of the woman's body in contemporary 
society as well as Dean MacCannel's and Juliet Flower MacCannel's 
on violence against women could be read in this sense, although as 
we have seen they point out the limits of Foucault's theories on 
resistance and repressed knowledges. Addressing the limits of re- 
verse-discourse in the case of lesbians who claim their right to an 
identity, Judith Butler also illustrates the functioning of docile tech- 
nologies of power within patriarchal power: 
oppression works not merely through acts of overt prohibition, 
but covertly, through the constitution of viable subjects and 
through the corollary constitution of a domain of unviable 
(un)subjects-abjects, we might call them-who are neither 
named nor prohibited within the economy of the law. Here 
oppression works through the production of a domain of un- 
thinkability and unnameability, the claim of an identity by 
means of reverse discourses for lesbians. ("Imitation" 20) 
As Christine Buci-Glucksmann demonstrates, the destabiliza- 
tion of the masculine during the age of mechanical reproduction 
did not erase misogyny but rather maintained it, albeit diverted by 
ambivalent discourses of androgyny or even bisexuality. She points 
to the fluctuating nature of patriarchy through the feminine figure, 
which has remained a projection of the masculine literary imagi- 
nary-whether she be presented under the mask of Salome or 
Sappho, she is at once praised and despised. 
Up Against Foucault ultimately raises the question: should femi- 
nists (also) forget Foucault? The sociological orientation of the book 
addresses concrete political issues that extend beyond the scope of 
Foucault's archaeological and genealogical methods, especially con- 
cerning a certain inadequacy of Foucault's notion of resistance in 
the 1990s, at least in Western societies. Indeed, Fatima Mernissi 13
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has shown that Islamic women, whose voices do not traverse West- 
ern media, are indeed the only people capable of challenging the 
fundamentalism of the Islamic state and street as well as the West- 
ern economical system. Whether resistance be operative or obso- 
lete, in Baudrillard's terms, power nonetheless remains unsteady 
and mobile. If Foucault's theory presents a general understanding 
of the modern functioning of power and its lack of origin, without 
entirely solving the enigma of power, it is because an understand- 
ing of power concerns the entire field of human sciences, not just 
philosophy, sociology, or psychology. In this sense, women's op- 
pression-without neglecting women's specificity-cannot be sepa- 
rated from that of other marginalized groups, nor can women be 
excluded from complicity in some forms of oppression, since hier- 
archies are still maintained not only between women, but across 
the lines of race, class, and Western/non-Western paradigms. 
Paul Bove has noted that Foucault has often been misappropri- 
ated for various reasons. Yet, as Jon Simons recently indicated, 
Foucault's voice has often simply been reformulated unwittingly 
through the very voices of those who criticize him; such is the case 
of Habermas and indeed of some of the feminist critics in Up Against 
Foucault. 
Notes 
I. Kate Soper calls into question Foucault's reading of the Lapcourt inci- 
dent (a little girl was "slavered over in a ditch" by a mentally disturbed 
man), which is based on a series of mediated discourses: the report of the 
little girl to her parents; the mayor's to the gendarmes; the indictment of 
the simple-minded man by the judge who later passed the case over to a 
doctor who himself turned it over to two other experts who finally pub- 
lished a report. Not only was the "truth" of the event quite possibly lost in 
this chain of discourse, but Foucault's omission of the functioning of these 
discourses in the Lapcourt case and his conclusion about "the pettiness of 
it all" reveal for Kate Soper the extent to which he is caught in the power- 
knowledge system he denounces: "The problem is to know how Foucault 
knows that 'nothing' was going on. Why should we accept the word for it 
of one who was not there, who never interviewed the child, who is argu- 
ably himself caught up in the discourse of 'inconsequential bucolic plea- 
sures . . " (43). 
2. See for example Joseph Bristow's Sexual Sameness and Jonathan 
Dollimore's Sexual Dissidence on the (mis)representation of gays and lesbi- 14




ans, and Michel Laronde's Autour du roman beur on the panoptical divi- 
sion of space in Paris and Parisian suburbs, which is designed to reinforce 
police and immigration control surveillance. 
3. According to M.E. Bailey, Adrienne Rich has demonstrated that "hu- 
man sexual norms are social/cultural constructs." She also adds that "this 
is not a particularly original or perceptive revelation" (110). In fact, Rich's 
notion of "compulsory heterosexuality" (which M.E. Bailey skips) encom- 
passes the programming of women not only to adjust to, but to perpetuate 
heterosexual norms within the economic, political, and language system. 
Judith Butler has drawn her notion of the heterosexual matrix (an opposi- 
tional and hierarchical "discursive/espistemic model of gender intelligi- 
bility") from both Monique Wittig and Adrienne Rich. 
4. Significantly, the violent metaphors in the French text often lose their 
impact in translation. For example, Foucault's epinglage [stapling] 
(Histoire 143) becomes "interpenetration" (History 108); a family "traguant 
[hunting down] en soi les moindres traces de sexuality, s'arrachant a elle- 
mime les aveux les plus difficiles" (Histoire 146) is rather "engaged in 
searching out the slightest traces of sexuality in its midst, wrenching from 
itself the most difficult confessions" (History 111). 
5. By legal and/or bureaucratic violence the authors mean "formal filing 
of false accusations, arbitrary firings and evictions, insertion without due 
process of 'black marks' into a person's record, blacklisting . . . for the 
sole purpose of destroying an individual's capacity to support themselves 
and their dependents. . . ." Administrative violence "is not an abuse of the 
rules," rather "it is a heartless . . . over-application of rules and regula- 
tions. . ." It "ranges from petty authoritarianism to torture and 'adminis- 
trative massacre' (Hannah Arendt) or genocide-all re-conceived as 'un- 
fortunate' byproducts of enthusiastic organisational `candoism.' Every- 
one is involved in the 'process' together so no one is responsible for it" 
(213). 
6. "And if it is true that Machiavelli was among the few-and this no 
doubt was the scandal of his ' cynicism' -who conceived the power of the 
Prince in terms of force relationships, perhaps we need to go one step 
further, do without the persona of the Prince, and decipher power mecha- 
nisms on the basis of a strategy that is immanent in force relationships" 
(History 97). 
7. Foucault includes Charcot in confessional practices but not Freud, who, 
in his opinion, was the first to posit the separation of sexuality (as a law 
principle, the Sovereign-Father) from a symbolics of blood. This separa- 
tion was meant to counteract neuropsychiatry and the rise of racism in that 
period and consequently go against fascism (see History 148-50). This 
view of psychoanalysis, following the Anti-Oedipus, seems rather idealis- 15
Fisher: Should Feminists Forget Foucault?
Published by New Prairie Press
242 STCL, Volume 22, No. 1 (Winter, 1998) 
tic and insufficient. Habermas is critical of psychoanalysis since its con- 
fessional practices produce fictional realities: "psychoanalysis gives the 
form of scientifically established therapy to these technologies of truth, 
which do not open up the interior of individuals, but produce interiority 
for the first time by means of an ever thicker web of relations to self" 
(273). Maureen McNeil has also expressed similar concerns (see her "Danc- 
ing with Foucault" 154-55). 
8. For Baudrillard, if power is everywhere and sexuality is everything, 
both power and sexuality have already disappeared (at least in the way 
Foucault speaks of them): "Sex, like man, or like the category of the so- 
cial, may only last for a while. And what if sex's reality effects . . . also 
started to fade away radically, giving way to other simulacra and dragging 
down with it the great referents of desire, the body, and the unconscious 
." (89). 
9. Similarly, Alain Finkielkraut has argued that the so-called sexual revo- 
lution of the 1960s was in fact the implantation of a new "monosexist" 
order, in which the politics of "genitalism" (the penis as the sole sex or- 
gan) and of the orgasm-at-all-cost erased bodies and passions and thus 
engendered a deeper alienation of both women and men (see his Le nouveau 
clesordre amoureux 15-51). 
10. Susan Bordo does not expand her analysis on Madonna here. Marjorie 
Garber writes of Madonna: "Squeezing the crotch of her pants became for 
her, on stage, the moment of the claim to empowered transvestism, to seem 
rather than merely to have or to be-not (and this distinction is important) 
just a claim to empowered womanhood" (127). Interestingly, this gesture 
is an imitation of Michael Jackson, a hyperreal figure who, like Cher, has 
erased his ethnic "defects." Marjorie Garber also notes that if "the playful 
clowning" of lesbianism by Madonna may appeal to rock fans or some 
gays and lesbians, it is also "offensive and threatening to people like Sena- 
tor Jesse Helms" (160). 
11. Jean Grimshaw is particularly critical of The Use of Pleasure not only 
because Foucault returns to the Greeks, but because the "practices of self- 
monitoring and self-surveillance are no longer seen as disciplinary prac- 
tices which undermine all notions of the autonomy of the self; they are 
rather constituting autonomy" and therefore are of no use in contempo- 
rary culture where 'self-surveillance' is largely programmed by the me- 
dia, fitness centers, therapeutic institutions, etc. Similar concerns are ad- 
dressed by Caroline Ramazanoglu and Janet Holland in "Women's Sexu- 
ality" (241). 
12. "Gender is, thus, a construction that regularly conceals its genesis; the 
tacit collective agreement to perform, produce, and sustain discrete and 
polar genders as cultural fictions is obscured by the credibility of those 16




productions-and the punishments that attend not agreeing to believe in 
them; the construction 'compels' our belief in its necessity and natural- 
ness" (Gender Trouble 140). 
13. The panoptical effect is never mentioned in relation to societal appa- 
ratuses of self-surveillance and self-discipline, whether it be in relation to 
the female body, anorexia, gender roles and compulsory heterosexuality 
(two issues that are missing in this collection of essays), or to victims who 
blame themselves when they are raped or abused "in the security" of their 
own home, or who are raped for having "made the mistake" of being in the 
wrong neighborhood or the wrong place at the wrong time (Mac Cannel 
and Mac Cannel 207-08). 
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